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This paper analyzes the process of endogenous union formation in the context of a 
sequential bargaining model between a firm and several unions and tries to explain why 
workers  may  be  represented  by  several  unions  of  different  sizes.  We  show  that  the 
equilibrium number of unions and their relative size depend on workers' attitudes toward 
the risk of unemployment and union configuration is independent of labor productivity.  
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  1. Introduction 
The labor market is not a perfectly competitive market. There may be considerable market power on 
the  demand  side  and  also  on  the  supply  side  since  workers  group  into  unions  to  improve  their 
bargaining position. 
Previous work has analyzed different aspects of union configuration (De la Rica and Espinosa, 
1997;  Horn  and  Wolinsky,  1988;  MacDonald  and  Solow,  1981;  Manning,  1987c;  Naylor,  1995; 
Nickell  and  Andrews,  1983;  Oswald,  1985);  however,  most  of  the  literature  on  the  labor  market 
assumes one or several unions but the number of unions is exogenously given and never determined in 
the model. In this paper we formalize the process of union formation and try to explain why workers 
may be represented by several unions instead of joining forces in a single union with more market 
power. More precisely, we look at labor productivity and workers' preferences as potential factors for 
the equilibrium number of unions and their relative size. 
The  formation  of  groups  or  coalitions  in  the  presence  of  spillovers  or  externalities  among 
coalitions has been the focus of attention of the literature on endogenous group formation and has been 
applied  to  various  fields  in  economics  like  mergers  in  Cournot  markets,  partnership  formation  or 
international environmental agreements, among others (Bloch, 1995; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1998; 
Espinosa, and Macho Stadler, 2003; Ray and Vohra, 1999; Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, 1983). This 
non cooperative theory of coalition formation uses the following framework: There is a first stage in 
which players take actions leading to a given group structure; when that coalition formation process is 
over, a non cooperative game is played and payoffs for each player depend on the group structure 
formed in the first stage. The fact that individual payoffs depend on the whole coalition structure is a 
consequence of the external effects (spillovers) that the formation of coalitions imposes on the other players. 
In this context, the present paper tries to contribute towards the understanding of the process of 
endogenous  union  formation.  In  our  model,  in  the  first  stage  workers  participate  in  an  open 
membership game of union formation (Yi and Shin, 1995; Yi, 1997; Belleflamme, 2000), i.e. each 
worker decides which union she wants to belong to, and no worker can be excluded from a union. 
After the number and composition of unions is so determined, the unions and the firm engage in a 
wage and employment determination game under the rules of the monopoly union model, that is, we 
consider a bilateral monopoly in the labor market in which unions make a ''take it or leave it'' offer 
concerning the wage and the firm decides employment from each union (Dunlop 1944; Farber, 1986; 
Oswald, 1985). 
In the first part of the paper, we assume identical workers who will form unions that only differ 
in size. Later on, we analyze the case of workers that group into unions with different behavior in their 
bargaining with the firm (unions may be more or less ''tough'' in this bargaining). This game theoretic 
perspective proves useful to explain the number and size of unions. We show that union configuration 
depends  on  workers'  attitudes  toward  the  risk  of  unemployment  and  it  is  independent  of  labor 
productivity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the bargaining process. 
Section  3  solves  the  model  under  the  assumption  of  symmetric  workers.  Section  4  assumes 
heterogeneous unions. Section 5 concludes with the main results. 
  
 
2. The model 
 
2.1. The union formation game 
Assume n workers  ￿i ￿ N￿ decide which unions they are going to form before bargaining with a firm. 
We formalize this process as a simultaneous open membership game. Each worker i announces xi from 
the set (1, 2, … n). All unions with a non empty set of announcements are formed provided they reach 
the minimum size (which will be defined later on as a fraction of the total number of workers),  
Sj ￿ ￿i ￿ N : xi ￿ j￿  
 
As a result, we have a union structure:   
￿S1,S2,...Sr￿,    r ￿ n 
 
 These r unions will bargain with the firm. 
 
 
2.2. The workers 
Each worker i has a utility function that depends on wage (w) and employment (l): 
 
 Vi￿w,l￿ ￿ ui￿w￿ l
t ￿ ui￿0￿ 1 ￿ l
t   
 
where l/t  is the probability of being employed; l is employment measured by the number of employed 
workers, t is the total number of workers (employed and unemployed) and reservation wage has been 
normalized to zero. We assume that the number of hours of work per period is not a decision variable 
but  it  is  fixed;  ui(w)  is  a  concave  function  to  represent  risk  aversion  on  workers'  preferences.  In 
particular, we will assume that workers have a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function 
(Blanchard and Fisher, 1989), so: 
 
 ui￿w￿ ￿ w1￿￿i
1￿￿i                                                                                                                                         
 
where σi Î(0,1) is the risk aversion coefficient of worker i; a greater value of σi indicates more risk aversion. 
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2.3. The unions 








    
                                                                                                                               (2)    
              
where lj is the number of members of union Sj who are employed; tj is the total number of members of 
union Sj ;  ηj = 1   σj  and  σj  is the CRRA coefficient of the median member of union Sj. A higher 
value of ηj corresponds to a higher preference for high wages, then, ηj is a measure of the ''toughness'' 
of union Sj in the bargaining with the firm. 
  
2.4. The firm 
 The firm has a production function:  
F￿L￿ ￿ ￿L ￿ L2
2   
 where L is the total number of workers employed by the firm, and θ is the productivity parameter. 
 
The profits can be expressed as: 
 ￿￿w,l￿ ￿ pF￿L￿ ￿ wL  
 
 We will assume the firm behaves as a price taker in the product market, so that p is fixed, and it will 
be normalized to p = 1. The demand for labor is then:  
L￿w￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ w  
 
2.5. The bargaining process 
From the union formation game we have a coalition structure {S1, S2, … Sr }. Assume for simplicity that 
unions are ordered so that   t1  ≥ t2  ≥ …≥ tr .  
  Wage and employment determination is formalized through a sequential game similar to the 
monopoly union model (Banerji, 2002; Chica and Espinosa, 2009; Dobson, 1994; Manning, 1987a). 
When several unions are formed we will assume that the firm deals with them sequentially so that it 
bargains with the largest union S1 first, then with S2, … and it bargains with Sr last.
1 Each union Sj 
announces a wage wj and then, the firm decides on the employment for members of that union lj. We 
assume  that forming  a  union  has  a  small  fixed  cost so that  unions  will have  a  minimum  size.  In 
particular, for a union to form, membership should be at least a fraction a of the total number of 







  and    Î a (0, 1) 
 
3. Symmetric workers 
                                                 
1It can be checked that the firm could not benefit from a change in this order. 
 
  In this section we will solve the model for the case σi = σ  for all  i Î N, so that ηj = η  for all  j Î {1, 
2, …., r}.  
  
3.1. The equilibrium of the bargaining process 
 
We solve the game backwards to calculate the subgame perfect equilibrium.  
 
The profit function for the firm is: 
 















When the firm bargains with union Sk its labor demand is given by the first order condition of the 
maximization problem: 
















 s.t.    ￿l1,...,lk￿1￿ ￿ l 1,..., l k￿1   
 
The first order condition of this maximization problem is:  
 







l j ￿ lk ￿ ￿
j￿k￿1
r














So, when k = r: 
2 
lr ￿ ￿ ￿ wr ￿￿
j￿1
r￿1
l j     
                                                                                                                               (3) 
 
and union  Sr  should ask for a wage such that: 
 





tr   
  s.t.    ￿3￿  
 




￿￿1 ￿ ￿ wr ￿ ￿
j￿1
r￿1
l j ￿ 0
  
 
which yields the optimal wage: 
wr ￿





    
                                                                                                                               (4) 
 
Substituting (4) in (3): 
                                                 


















    
                                                                                                                                         (5) 
 








￿1 ￿ ￿￿2h￿1     
                                                                                               (6) 
 
with  h: 0, 1, 2, ….(r   1) 
 








    
                                                                                                                            (7) 
 
 
  Note  that  the  higher  the  priority  of  the  union  (the  higher  h)  the  higher  the  wage  and  the 
employment level. This implies that with symmetric workers we may obtain in equilibrium more than 
one union only if the larger union bargains first: Being a member of a larger union implies a higher 
wage and a higher employment but, since membership is also larger, possibly a higher probability of 
being unemployed. 
 
  Substituting the equilibrium levels of employment, (6) and (7) can be expressed in terms of the 
parameters of the model as:  
 
lr￿h ￿ ￿ ￿￿r￿h￿￿1
￿1 ￿ ￿￿r￿h     
                                                                                                                              (8) 
wr￿h ￿ ￿
￿r￿2 ￿ ￿￿h
￿1 ￿ ￿￿r￿h     
                                                                                                                            (9)                                                                                         
 
with  h: 0, 1, 2, ….(r   1)  
                                   
         
  Wage for union (r h) is negatively related to the number of unions, r, but it is higher the higher 
the toughness of the unions η and the priority of the union in the sequential process, h. Employment 
level for union (r h), however, is independent of the total number of unions, but higher the higher the 
priority of that union; moreover, in general, each union´s employment level it is positively related to 
the toughness of the unions, η, except for the first union to take part in negotiations (the union that gets 
the highest wages and the highest employment level). Therefore, the higher the priority of the union in 
negotiations, the higher both the wage and the employment level. This is due to the effect of sequential 
negotiation; in fact, it can be checked that the firm could not benefit form a change in this order. 
  On  the  other  hand,  total  employment  is  positively related to  the  total  number of  unions,  r 
                                                 
3 Note that h representes the priority in negotiations; for example, the priority for union r is 0 and for 
union 1 is (r 1). 
 (although  each union´s  employment is not affected by this change), but it is lower the higher the 
toughness of the unions, η. That is, the more unions there are, the more competitive the labor market 
becomes, so that for a given level of employment, the lower the wage. Regarding the relationship 
between total employment and the toughness of the unions, the more aggressive the unions are the 
lower the total employment. 
 
 
3.2. The equilibrium of the union formation game 





tr￿h   
 
  Substituting (8) and (9) we obtain utility as a function of the number of unions, r, the order of 
union in the negotiations, h, and membership tr h: 
 
Vi￿tr￿h,h,r￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿r￿￿￿1￿￿￿h￿2￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿
h￿
tr￿h￿1 ￿ ￿￿r￿1￿￿￿￿h￿1￿￿￿     
                  (10) 
 
  A Nash equilibrium coalition structure (S1, S2, … Sr) is such that no worker wishes to change 
unions. Since workers are identical, this means that the utility of any worker is the same no matter the 
union she belongs to. First, we consider that there are at most two unions. If all the workers have the 
same risk aversion, will they group into a single union? We assume that the firm always bargains first 
with the largest union. Thus, a worker i in union i with ti members compares the utility in union 1 to 
that of union 2. We also suppose that to form the second union a minimum number of workers, l2, is 
needed.
4 The firm does not bargain with individual workers. 
 
  Therefore, two unions can form in equilibrium if the following conditions hold:  
Vi￿t1,1,2￿ ￿ Vi￿t2,0,2￿                                                                                                                        (11) 
   t1 ≥ t2    and  








￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿     
                        (12) 
 
Note that t1 / t2 does not depend on h nor r, and it is greater than one, so that, the first union is always 
larger than the second one. 
 




￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2￿
￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿
1￿￿ T     
                                                                                                      (13) 
t2
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿ T     
                                                                                                      (14) 
                                                 
4The minimun number of workers is chosen so as to avoid corner solutions. 
 
  
Note that the size of the unions does not depend on the productivity parameter q. However, for  t2








Thus, for an interior solution with r = 2 we have to impose the following condition on the total number 
of unionized workers: 
T ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿1 ￿ ￿￿
2     
                                                                                                      (15) 
 
From (13) and (14) we obtain the number of unemployed members at each union: 
 
t1
￿ ￿ l1 ￿
￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿T ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿
                                               (16) 
t2
￿ ￿ l2 ￿
￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿2T ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿2     
                                                                       (17) 
 
  It can be checked that unemployment is larger at the first union and also that the first union has 
a  higher  probability  of  unemployment.
5  The  higher  the  productivity  parameter,  the  lower  the 
unemployment in each union. 
 
We have obtained a Nash equilibrium of the open membership game with two unions. This is 
not, however, the only Nash equilibrium. We find that all workers in a single union is also a Nash 
equilibrium, since there is no profitable individual deviation (an individual deviation would yield a 
zero utility level). However, this equilibrium is not robust to group deviations: if a group of l2 workers 
deviate  and  form  another  union  their  utility  may  increase,  as  long  as  the  grand  coalition  is  large 
enough, that is, if: 
    
T ￿ ￿
￿1 ￿ ￿￿
1￿￿￿￿     
                                                                                                                             (18) 
   
  Then: 
Vi￿t2 ￿ l2,0,2￿ ￿ Vi￿T,0,1￿  
 
  This second union would ask for a lower wage so as to increase its employment probability.
6 
Also, if a group of l1 workers deviate to form another union their utility may increase also as long as T 




￿2 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿     
                                                                                                                              (19) 
 
  Then: 
                                                 
5See Appendix A.I. 
6See Appendix A.II. Vi￿t1 ￿ l1,1,2￿ ￿ Vi￿T,0,1￿  
 
  Condition (18) is more restrictive than condition (19), so that if condition (18) holds there 
would be at least two groups of members with incentives to deviate. Therefore, all workers in a single 
union is a strong Nash equilibrium only if T is not very large, in particular, if (19) does not hold. 
 
Similarly, when we consider a maximum of r unions, for all of them to exist in equilibrium the 
utility of any worker has to be the same no matter the union she belongs to. Therefore, r unions can 
form in equilibrium if the following conditions hold: 
 
Vi￿tr￿￿h￿1￿,h ￿ 1,r￿ ￿ Vi￿tr￿h,h,r￿                    
tr￿￿h￿1￿ ￿ tr￿h       
and 









￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿     
                                                                                                          (21) 
 











tr￿h  decreases with η.  
 
 
To find the equilibrium, we solve the following system: 
tr￿￿h￿1￿ ￿ tr￿hK ￿h : 0,1,....,￿r ￿ 1￿












T     
                                                                                                                                 (22) 










Hence, the equilibrium number of unions is: 
  (20)  
r


















                                                                                    (23)    
                                                                                                                               
We can now state our main result: 
 
Result 1. When unions maximize the utility of the representative worker, the equilibrium number of 
unions is decreasing in the workers’ aversion to the risk of unemployment, σ. The lower the parameter 
α, which represents the cost of forming a union, the larger the equilibrium number of unions. Union 
configuration is independent of the productivity parameter q. 
 
  The equilibrium configuration of r
* unions of tr h
* members, is not the unique Nash equilibrium; 
the grand coalition is also a trivial Nash equilibrium since a worker cannot deviate and form a union by 
himself. However, the equilibrium configuration of r
* unions of tr h
* members is not a strong Nash 
equilibrium because the utility of a representative member of union tr h
* will increase if unions form the 
grand coalition. As shown in the case of r = 2, there may be other Nash equilibria with lower r but they 
are not robust to group deviations. 
 
 
4. Heterogeneous Unions 
 In this section we assume that unions have their own preferences ηj Î(0, 1), jÎ{1,..., r}, and do not 
maximize the utility of the median worker. The parameter ηj is a measure of the toughness of union Sj 
in the bargaining with the firm and unions may be different in this respect. 
  
4.1. The equilibrium of the bargaining process 
Similarly to section 3.1. we solve the game backwards to calculate the subgame perfect equilibrium. 














   
  r h ¹  r 
                            






￿1￿￿j￿   
   










    
                        (25) 
 
  The equilibrium wage for union (r h) is positively related to its priority in negotiations h, and 
negatively to the number of unions at the firm r. In this case, it is also positively related to both its 
toughness ηr h and other unions’ toughness in negotiations with the firm ηj .  
Similarly,  employment  for  union  (r h)  does  not  depend  on  the  total  number  of  unions  r  and  is 
positively  related  to  its  priority  in  negotiations  h.  In  this  case,  however,  for  all  unions  (r h)  the 
equilibrium employment level is negatively related to its toughness ηr h but given lr (h+1), positively 
related to the other unions’ toughness.  
  Concerning total employment, it increases with the total number of unions, r (reflecting a more 
competitive labor market), but it is lower the higher the toughness of the unions, ηi (in fact, the effect 
of the unions’ toughness on total employment is the same regardless the priority of the union).  
 4.2. The equilibrium of the union formation game 
When unions have different behavior in their bargaining with the firm, a worker i belonging to a union 






tr￿h                                                                                                         (26) 
 















    
                                                       (27) 
 
 
Note that a Nash equilibrium coalition structure (S1, S2,... Sr) is such that no worker wishes to 
change unions. For the sake of simplicity we assume that all workers have the same risk aversion, that 
is, σi = σ. 
We consider, first, that there are two unions. We assume that the firm always bargains first with 
the largest union. Thus, a worker i in a union  Sr h with tr h members compares the utility of belonging 
to union 1 to that of belonging to union 2. We also suppose that to form the second union at least l2 
members  are  needed  (defined below).  Therefore,  to have  two  unions  in equilibrium  the following 
condition should hold:  
Vi￿t1,1,2￿ ￿ Vi￿t2,0,2￿                                                                                                                         (28) 
t1 ￿ t2  
and  
t2 ￿ l2 ￿ ￿￿1
￿1 ￿ ￿1￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿  
 






￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿
￿1     
                                                                                                            (29) 
 
Note that t1 / t2 does not depend on r. 
  
Taking into account (29) and T = t1 + t2 we obtain the number of members of each union: 
 
t1 ￿
￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿
￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿2￿
1￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿ T     
                                                                                               (30) 
t2 ￿ ￿1
￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿ T     
                                                                                               (31) 
  
To  check  whether  the  condition  t1  ≥  t2  holds,  suppose  that  η1  is  very  large  so  that 
                                                 
7See Appendix B.I. 
 ￿1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿
1￿￿, then t2 > t1. Therefore, the first union in negotiation (the largest according 
to our asumption) cannot be much tougher than the second, that is: 
 





That is, since workers are identical, unions cannot be too different for an equilibrium configuration to 
exist. When the two unions have the same behavior in bargaining, η1=η2= η, we have that t2 ￿ t1   if       
￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿
￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿
1￿￿. It can be checked that for σÎ(0, 1) and ηÎ(0, 1) this inequality does not hold. 
Thus, in equilibrium there will be a big union (union 1) and a small union (union 2). 
 
Moreover, for an interior solution and r = 2 we have to impose the following condition on the 
total number of workers: 
  
T ￿
￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿2￿
1￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿
￿1 ￿ ￿1￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
    
                                                                                                (32) 
  
Taking into account (30) and (31) the number of unemployed members at each union is given 
by: 
t1 ￿ l1 ￿
￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿1￿T ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿
￿1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿1￿
                                  (33) 
t2 ￿ l2 ￿
T￿1￿1 ￿ ￿1￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿
￿1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿
1￿￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿1￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
                                               (34) 
  




We  have  obtained  a  Nash  equilibrium  of  the  open  membership  game  with  two  unions.  In 
equilibrium all the workers enjoy the same expected utility level. The members of the first union have 
higher wages but also a higher probability of unemployment. This is not, however, the only Nash 
equilibrium. We find that all workers in the first union is also a Nash equilibrium, since there is not a 
profitable individual deviation (an individual deviation would yield a zero utility level). However, this 
equilibrium is not robust to group deviations: if a group of l2 workers deviate and form another union 
their utility may increase, as long as the grand coalition is large enough, that is, if: 
 
   ( )

















T                                                                                                                              (35) 
 
  Then: 
 
 Vi (T, 0, 1)£ Vi (t2, 0, 2) 
 
Therefore, if the grand coalition is large enough, a group of workers form a second union that 
asks for a lower wage and increases the probability of employment.
9 We are assuming that the firm 
                                                 
8See Appendix B.II. 
9See Appendix B.III. 
 bargains first with the largest union, but when unions differ in their parameter ηi, it is possible that the 
firm is interested in negotiating first with the smaller union either because it has lower or a higher η. It 
can be checked that whether it bargains first with the most aggressive or the less aggressive union, the 
firm supports the same labor costs. 
 
Similarly, when we consider r unions, for all of them to form in equilibrium, the utility of any 
worker has to be the same no matter the union she belongs to. The necessary conditions for an  r  union 
configuration are: 
 
Vi￿tr￿￿h￿1￿,h ￿ 1,r￿ ￿ Vi￿tr￿h,h,r￿ 
tr￿￿h￿1￿ ￿ tr￿h       
 
and 






                                                (36) 
           




￿2 ￿ ￿r￿h￿1￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿r￿h￿￿
￿r￿￿h￿1￿     
                          (37) 
 
For the sake of notational simplicity, we denote:  
kr￿￿h￿1￿ ￿
￿2 ￿ ￿r￿h￿1￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿r￿h￿￿
￿r￿￿h￿1￿     
                                                                                                   (38) 
 
It can be checked that kr (h+1) is greater than one and negatively related to the workers’ aversion 
to the risk of unemployment, σ. Regarding the toughness of the unions, kr (h+1) decreases with hr (h+1) 
but  it  is  positively  related  to  hr h.  Nervertheless,  when  the  toughness  of  all  unions  increases  the 
parameter kr (h+1) decreases. 
 
To find the equilibrium, we solve the following system: 
 
tr￿￿h￿1￿ ￿ tr￿hkr￿￿h￿1￿ ￿h : 0,1,....,￿r ￿ 1￿
T ￿ t1 ￿ t2 ￿...tr   
 







































We can now determine the equilibrium number of unions: 
 
r


































To conclude, we state the main result of this section: 
 
Result  2.  When  unions  do  not  maximize  the  utility  of  the  median  worker  but  have  their  own 
preferences, the lower the workers’ aversion to the risk of unemployment, σ, the lower the equilibrium 
number of unions. The equilibrium number of unions decreases with the parameter α, which represents 
the cost of forming a union, and increases with the toughness of the unions. 
 
       
  5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we analyze endogenous union formation in the context of a sequential bargaining model 
between a firm and several unions, under the rules of the monopoly union model. We deal with the 
process of union formation and try to explain why workers may end up being represented by one or 
several unions. The characteristics of the market and the workers’ preferences are potential factors in 
the determination of the number of unions and their relative size. We show that union configuration 
depends  on  workers’  attitudes  toward  the  risk  of  unemployment  but  it  is  independent  of  labor 
productivity. 
In the first part of the paper we assume that workers have the same aversion to the risk of 
unemployment and that once a union is formed the union maximizes the utility function of the median 
member. As a result, we obtain that unions will only differ on size. In this case, the lower the workers’ 
aversion  to  the  risk  of  unemployment,  the  higher  the  toughness  of  the  unions  and  the  larger  the 
equilibrium number of unions.  
In  the  second  part  we  analyze  the  case  of  workers  that  group  into  unions  with  different 
preferences in their bargaining with the firm, that is, unions may be more or less ''tough'' in their 
bargaining, but they do not maximize the utility of the median worker. This assumption on union’ 
behaviour yields the opposite result: the number of unions is increasing with the workers’ aversion to 
the risk of unemployment. 
In both cases the higher the toughness of the unions the higher the equilibrium number of unions and 
the smaller their sizes. The cost of forming a union, has always a negative effect on the equilibrium 
number of unions.  
  We have ignored many interesting aspects of the labor market like the comparison of patterns 
of  bargaining  (simultaneous  or  sequential)  and  institutional  environments  (different  rules  of  the 
negotiation process). A next step is to formalize the question of endogenous union formation under the 
assumption of the Nash bargaining rules, and to check in which direction simultaneous negotiations 
could change the results. We leave this analysis for further research. 
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Appendix A (Homogeneous unions) 
  
 
A.I. Unemployment is larger in the first union if: 
  ￿t1 ￿ l1￿ ￿ ￿t2 ￿ l2￿  
￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 2￿
￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿





2T ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2￿
￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿
1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿  
T ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿2     
                                                                                         (A.1)   
  
For  t2 ￿ l2 and r = 2 we have to impose the following condition: 
 
T ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿
￿1 ￿ ￿￿
2     
                                                                                                    (A.2) 
 
Taking into account (A.2.) we have that: 
 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿1 ￿ ￿￿
2 ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ 2￿
￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿














There would be a deviation of  t2 if: 
  Vi￿t2,0,2￿ ￿ Vi￿T,0,1￿  
That is, if: 
t2 ￿ ￿￿￿1
￿1 ￿ ￿￿
￿￿1 T     
                                                                                                                            (A.3) 
 
In  the  case  of  the  best  deviation,  if  l2  workers  change  union  to  form  union  2,  the  utility  of  the 
representative worker i would be: 
 









1￿￿￿￿     
                                                                                                                          (A.4) 
 Similarly, there would be a deviation of t1 workers if: 
  Vi￿t1,1,2￿ ￿ Vi￿T,0,1￿  
 




￿1 ￿ ￿￿2￿ T     
                                                                                                                           (A.5) 
 
More precisely, if l1 workers change union and form union 1, the utility of a worker i would be: 
 









￿2 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿     
                                                                                                                           (A.6) 
 




APPENDIX B (Heterogeneous unions) 
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￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿1￿t1
    
                                                                                      (B.3) 
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￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿
￿1     
                                                                                                           (B.4) 
 
 
B.II. Unemployment at the first union is higher than at the second if: 
  
￿t1 ￿ l1￿ ￿ ￿t2 ￿ l2￿
    
￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿1￿T ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿ T￿1￿1 ￿ ￿1￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿
 
   
T ￿ ￿
￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿ ￿ ￿1
￿1 ￿ ￿1￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿
1￿￿ ￿ ￿1
    
                                                                    (B.5) 
  
For  t2 ≥ l2  and  r = 2  we have to impose the following condition: 
  
T ￿
￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿2￿
1￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿
￿1 ￿ ￿1￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
    
                                                                                               (B.6) 
  
Taking into account (B.6) we have that if: 
  
￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿
￿1 ￿ ￿1￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿ ￿
￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿ ￿ ￿1
￿1 ￿ ￿1￿￿1 ￿ ￿2￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿ ￿ ￿1
 
 
￿1 ￿ ￿2￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿2￿1￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
 
 For σÎ(0, 1) and ηi >0 the previous inequality holds. Therefore, (B.5) holds and so unemployment 
level at the first union is larger than at the second one. 
  
 
B.III. If there is a single union, the utility of worker i would be: 
 
  Vi (T, 0, 1) =  
( )



































1 ￿ ￿  
 
And the utility in the second union is larger, that is: 
 
 Vi (T, 0, 1)£ Vi (t2, 0, 2) 
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